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II.  TRADE FACILITATION, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AND DEVELOPMENT IMPACT:  FRAMEWORK
AND EXPERIENCE
By Florian A. Alburo
Introduction
It is important to lay out a framework for understanding how trade facilitation (TF)
affects  the  movement  of  goods,  and  where  information  technology  (IT)  fits  in.    This
relationship, in turn, sets the stage for locating small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
in international transactions.  There is an increasing amount of substantial literature on TF
and equally wide knowledge of IT.  While it is not the intent of this chapter to survey these
materials,  to  the  extent  that  they  are  relevant  to  the  following  discussion,  they  will  be
referred to appropriately.
Section A elaborates on TF and the wide range of instruments that have been used
and  analysed  while  section  B  details  some  actual  experiences  in  the  use  of  IT  in TF.
Section  C  examines  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  and  IT  in  TF.    Section  D
summarizes this chapter and considers the implications for inclusive growth.
A.  Framework and empirical evidence
Identification of the channels and mechanisms by which trade barriers other than
transparent  tariffs,  when  removed  or  reduced,  affect  commercial  transactions  –  levels,
composition and speed – and overall economic conditions is at the core of the framework
needed to understand the development impact of the use of IT in TF.  The removal or
reduction of these barriers and the associated measures that both the public and private
sectors apply are within the scope of TF, although there may then be a need to delineate
the instruments that include the use of IT.  How IT comes into TF, to the extent that it is not
an integral part of it, also becomes part of this framework.
In an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (2002) study, TF was not directly
associated with the use of IT.  Rather, the study noted, TF was considered to comprise
activities in the movement of goods across borders that “... lower the costs of administration,
standardization,  technology,  information,  transaction,  labour,  communication,  insurance
and financing as well as reduce time costs related to these procedures.  The technology
costs are involved during standards procedures, and information costs arise while importing
or exporting goods and services.  These costs result in loss of economic efficiency and
reduce gains from trade...”.  What matters here are those actions by economic agents that
lower these costs.  Instead of considering various options for carrying out TF, the study
measured the effects of these TF activities on macroeconomic and trade variables.
On the other hand, the study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (2005) on the role of automation in TF analysed the effects of automating TF
measures, many of which are customs-related.  Indeed, the major focus of the study was26
on examining the impacts of automating the entire customs procedures related to imports
and exports.  The study surveyed the range of benefits and costs associated with such
automation.   Although  automation  is  not  seen  as  a  “panacea”  for  TF,  it  improves  the
movement of goods across borders.  A paperless environment, the increased use of the
Internet and a legal framework that allows digital transactions all suggest that an automated
TF increases the efficiency of commercial transactions.
There are at least two forms of thinking on TF and how IT fits into the scheme of
things.    One  is  simply  to  analyse  how  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade  affect  international
transactions on the trading countries.  Such a framework identifies those barriers and then
traces the effects of removing them, either in total or as specific components depending on
the array of those components.  The task of their reduction or removal comes within the
purview of trade facilitation, given that they are often non-tariff in nature.  This line of
thought  refrains  from  laying  out  how  the  TF  measures  are  to  be  undertaken  and
implemented.  Thus, IT does not enter into the framework in concrete ways and is often
left as part of the TF agenda.  IT may only be one means of addressing the reduction of
these barriers.
Another  view  is  simply  to  analyse  what  happens  to  trade  and  the  economy  in
a scenario where pervasive barriers are dominated by bureaucratic formalities, documentary
requirements and the involvement of multiple public and private agencies, and the ensuing
scenario  where  these  barriers  are  removed  through  automation  of  processes  and
procedures.  The presumption is that these processes and procedures act as bottlenecks
to the movement of goods across borders.  Automation is the trade facilitation measure
applied and its impact is in the speedier flow of goods.
It would appear that if there are differences in the underlying framework between
these two lines of thought they may be subtle, not striking.  Yet, when we go into some of
their details in terms of the scope of TF, methodology for measuring TF, and implications
for addressing and using IT, the differences may turn out to be more prominent.
1.  Trade barriers and measures, and empirical analyses
In the first place, the barriers that are identified and for which TF measures are
applied vary considerably.  These could be “non-price” wedges between domestic and
world prices including non-tariff measures (conventionally viewed as policy driven such as
licences  and  quotas),  transportation  bottlenecks,  logistics  constraints,  infrastructure
deficiencies and administrative weaknesses.
The innovative ways in which these have been further indicated or quantified have
grown in recent years.  In the APEC (2002) study, trade costs incorporate transactions
costs (transport and insurance), policy costs (tariff and non-tariff barriers) and facilitation
costs  (absence  of  trade  facilitation).    A  reduction  in  any  of  the  components  can  be
considered as equivalent to a reduction in trade costs.  While it is theoretically possible to
measure the incremental welfare effects of TF (depending on the parameters of import
demand and change in trade costs), the usual empirical basis for measuring barriers has
used results from surveys of firms about their magnitude.  In Arvis and others (2007), for27
example, TF practitioners rated a range of measures of logistics performance on a given
scale.  These various ways of quantifying the costs of TF have revealed such measures as
trade costs of non-tariff barriers as a share of total trade values, technology standards
imposing 10 per cent of production costs, the equivalence of health restrictions to tariffs,
costs  of  transport  restrictions  to  border  crossings  as  share  of  total  transport  time,
a monopoly in port services in terms of export taxes etc.
The results from surveys of business firms appear to indicate the relative importance
of different trade impediments, which can then be measured against trade costs.  In the
APEC (2002) study, the results reveal that high tariffs, complex customs and administration
procedures, trade restrictions and quotas, business mobility, standards and licences rank
in decreasing importance (as barriers) to international commerce.  Further breakdown of
these categories provides finer specifications of the impediments.  However, a consolidated
measure of costs is in terms of effects on transactions costs, prices of imported products
and increases in consumer demand by trade facilitation.  These variables are then used to
estimate  their  influence  on  the  broader  macroeconomic  indicators  such  as  aggregate
output, employment, wages, inflation, trade volumes and other trade-related indicators.
Their numerical impacts indicate how much they impinge on the economy in general and
on the trade sector in particular.  In addition, since the variables are only outcomes of
more specific actions, they do not point to direct TF measures.
Consider now what happens if we translate into specific variables the finding (from
surveys)  that  complex  customs  procedures  and  trade  administration  are  the  main
impediments to faster trade flows.  A common direction followed is a “time and motion”
study of the customs procedures and trade administration.  By breaking down the entire
procedure  into  component  parts  that  are  attributable  to  various  administrative
responsibilities, it is possible to measure the impacts of addressing individual components
on the speed of trade movements.  The increments can then be estimated in terms of
trade values, volumes and eventual effects on the economy.
In the second place, the way these barriers are modelled in determining how TF
measures  would  affect  the  trading  economies  equally  varies.    Some  studies  note  that
empirical analyses of TF employ an array of methods such as surveys (e.g., how important
barriers  are  to  traders),  gravity  models  (examining  the  importance  of  geography  in
explaining the existence of barriers), partial equilibrium analyses and general equilibrium
modelling.
Many of these models have been used to analyse the economic benefits of TF.  In
a  review  of  these  models  by  APEC  (2002),  partial  equilibrium  analyses  focused  on
estimates of the equivalence of trade restrictions to tariffs on consumer welfare gains and
in  terms  of  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  effects,  and  the  effects  of  standards  and
conformance in terms of trade costs (value of trade).  Surveys obviously focused on the
nuts-and-bolts of TF – time costs for freight loading, transactions costs and compliance
costs of standards.  Regression estimates revealed how much trade creation took place,
and the volume and value increases resulting, for example, from standardization.  The
larger computable general equilibrium (CGE) models yielded estimates of increases in real
incomes from tariff reductions and TF measures.  The inclusion of wider barriers to trade28
through infrastructure bottlenecks, logistics (domestic and international) networks, clearance
processes by customs and other agencies, facilities to track and trace shipments etc. has
used ratings by TF professionals regarding performance in individual countries (Arvis and
others, 2007).  These ratings can be used to trace their effects on larger macroeconomic
variables (e.g., impacts on trade and poverty).
Overall, in the context of this study, existing analytical frameworks of trade facilitation
are characterized by, on the one hand, the use of aggregate macroeconomic indicators,
trade impediments often indexed by surrogate variables, and models and methodologies
that do not fully take into account automation and other IT instruments; and on the other
hand, by the use of comparative indicators (usually from time-release studies) of trade
transaction efficiency before and after the institution of automation and other IT applications.
Changes in the comparative indicators are attributed to IT use as the principal TF measure,
although other related measures may also be included in the analyses.  The mechanisms
by which TF affects trade, aggregate output and income are similar, although the ways in
which they are arrived at may differ.  For example, changes in freight loading/unloading
times can be translated into increases in the volume of trade and other aggregate economic
indicators while impacts on trade volumes can be translated into increased movement of
goods across borders (loading/unloading times).  Indeed, they are mirrors of each other.
2.  GATT framework and empirical analyses
The underlying context of the TF framework laid out so far is the broad economic
changes that take place when non-tariff (and even more broadly, “behind-the-border” and
“inside-the-border”) impediments to trade are removed or reduced.  It takes into account
many interacting variables economy-wide.  However, a narrower context for TF has also
evolved,  defined  by  parameters  in  which  new  trade  rules  governing TF  will  eventually
emerge.  These relate to the GATT 1994 Articles V (Freedom of Transit), VIII (Fees and
Formalities Connected with Imports and Exports), and X (Publication and Administration of
Trade Regulations).
In the analytical exercises related to the framework, the success of TF measures
is  usually  indicated  by  a  fall  in  the  price  of  imports,  which  would  be  tantamount  to
improvements  in  activities  related  to  the  three  GATT Articles.    In  a  partial  equilibrium
setting it is then possible to estimate the effects of price reduction (in equivalent terms to
some TF initiatives) on trade and the larger macroeconomy.  Also, in the CGE modelling
the effects can be traced of the TF surrogates on specific sectors of the economy, various
components of demand and other aggregates.
Wilson,  Mann  and  Otsuki  (2004)  attempted  to  combine  the  ratings  of  various
impediments found in many surveys with more objective data on trade flows, tariff structure
and  traditional  explanatory  variables  of  trade  on  cross-country  experiences  covering
75 countries.  Four indicators of TF were constructed and used – standardized ratings on
port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment and service infrastructure.
They argued that these indicators reflected the TF agenda of Articles V (port efficiency),
VIII (customs environment), and X (regulatory environment) in addition to also indicating29
“border”  measures  (port  efficiency  and  customs  environment)  and  “behind-the-border”
measures (service infrastructure and regulatory environment).
The Wilson, Mann and Otsuki study results showing the importance of TF measures
in expanding trade appear to be consistent with limited country-level data.  Indeed, what
those results suggest is that unilateral TF reforms and implementation would lead to gains,
especially in terms of exports.  The types of reforms needed by each of the categories of
TF cannot be answered by the study but by a complementary framework that deals with
the actual “nuts and bolts” in the movement of goods across borders.
The Wilson, Mann and Otsuki study illustrated a combination of the two streams
out of the TF framework.  The further specification of the border trade impediments into
their components highlighted varying results.  In addition, as they indicated, the literature
that uses aggregative data tends to show large TF impacts simply because they generally
incorporate many of the particular activities involved in reducing trade barriers, both at the
border and behind the border.  They generally find high TF elasticities of trade.
1 This is
also validated in some of the CGE models used in evaluating the impacts of TF on the
aggregate economy.
The APEC (2002) study estimated that the increase in GDP arising from TF (which
is presumed to be reflected by a 5 per cent reduction in trade costs over five years across
all the economies) would be unevenly distributed, with Singapore recording the largest
gain  and  the  United  States  the  smallest  gain.
2 In the recent CGE simulation (Trade
Sustainability Impact Assessment) of the proposed ASEAN-European Union Free Trade
Area the results are similar – large output gains for some countries, small for others.  In
terms  of  export  (value)  increases,  the  underlying  TF  elasticities  are  quite  high  across
different TF configurations (proxied by a 1 per cent reduction in border costs for limited
FTA, and a 2 per cent cost reduction plus 1 per cent cost reduction in some sectors for
ambitious-plus FTA) analogous to the impacts on aggregate outputs (ECORYS, 2009).
It is also possible to observe the effects of a singular trade-facilitating measure on
the economies of trading partners.  Examples of such a singular measure include port
development,  transport  infrastructure,  logistics  support  and  IT  installation.
3 In actual
experience, a singular measure is often implemented as part of a larger package, especially
if  time  horizons  differ.    The  study  by  Warr,  Menon  and  Yusuf  (draft  manuscript  2009)
applied  general  equilibrium  modeling  to  evaluate  the  aggregate  effects  of  the  second
Mekong bridge between the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Thailand – providing
a new trade link that is directly connected with the road infrastructure of the East-West
1 The highest elasticity comes from improved port efficiency compared with the elasticity of improved
customs environment or services sector infrastructure. Note that port efficiency uses port facilities,
inland waterways and airports.
2 The 5 per cent reduction in trade costs is the trade facilitation target of the APEC economies.
3 Some of these singular measures, including standards harmonization, tariff-reduction equivalence
of saved shipping time, increased web hosts and trade flows, and reductions in bilateral telephone call
prices and bilateral trade flows, were reviewed in Wilson, Mann and Otsuki, 2004.30
Economic Corridor of the Greater Mekong Subregion – on trade together with other effects.
The model used in the study simulated the effects of different magnitudes of reduction in
transport costs between the two border provinces arising from the use of the bridge.
Initial results for the long term indicate large gains in trade not only between the
two countries but even larger gains in terms of each country’s trade (exports) to the rest of
the world.  The responses vary by commodity but in general it appears that there is greater
gain on the part of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic from the transport infrastructure
facility than on the part of Thailand.  These results however can not be truly attributable to
the infrastructure alone since the presumption is that cross-border facilities have equally
been provided.  This result was apparently confirmed when the bridge became operational
and the associated TF measures such as customs improvements (e.g., one-stop inspection
and electronic submission of declarations on the part of Thailand) were implemented.
This review of various ways of looking at trade facilitation suggests some common
framework in which changes take place.  There are obviously direct behavioural changes
on the part of economic agents along the chain from the moment goods arrive at the ports
until they are delivered to final destinations as well as indirectly on the broader surrounding
economy.   A  range  of  methodologies  are  applied  in  measuring  the  effects  of TF  and,
depending on the variable specification, these changes result from particular measures.
TF can also be seen as specific intervention modalities that can be considered as projects
for  which  ex  ante  benefits  can  be  identified  and  quantified.    When  combined  with
quantification of costs, it is possible to arrive at traditional benefit-cost ratios to determine
viability of the interventions.
Tracing behavioural changes of traders and other beneficiaries directly and indirectly
related to TF requires measuring its effects on trade and related sectors, and on the rest of
the economy through other channels (e.g., trade expansion leading to increases in per
capita GDP, real wages and real consumption).  Efforts have been made to not only to
develop  a  larger  framework  to  examine  the  impact  of  TF,  but  of  postulating  how  TF
influences the economy, e.g., in APEC (2002), ECORYS (2009) and Warr, Menon and
Yusuf (2009).  Data and information from multiple sources and the use of ratings from
trade specialists on effectiveness of TF would also be a way to trace the influence of TF
on specified dependent variables.  Duval (2006) relied on a survey of trade facilitation
expert to qualitatively assess the cost and benefits of specific trade facilitation measures.
Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2004) as well as, more recently, Helble and others (2009), try
to  quantify  the  impacts  of  TF  measures  on  trade  behaviour.    However,  because  the
combined data include objective and subjective variables, these results often have to be
complemented by other objective data.
4
4 A possible source of such data is the World Bank Doing Business dataset (www.doingbusiness.org),
which provides quantitative export and import time and cost data rather than perception based TF
performance indicators.  See Djankov, Freund and Pham (2006), and Duval and Utokhtam (2009) for
analysis of the impact of TF on trade using some of these indicators.31
Nevertheless, the underlying framework stays with behavioural changes.  What is
behind the assessments of benefits and costs of various TF measures (e.g., the institution
of advanced rulings, creation of post-clearance audit facilities and, electronic submission
of entry documents) is the measurable stream of benefits and costs that, in turn, imply
behavioural changes (on the part of the beneficiaries).  In the particular exercise of looking
at TF interventions as an economic project analysis, it is necessary to sift through the
quantitative results with regard to whether they are all caused by the intervention or not,
since comparisons of benefits before the intervention (through a TF project) and after the
intervention may not be totally due to that intervention.  This type of qualification also
holds true for all the other behavioural analyses of TF.
Assessments not within the immediate ambit of the above framework are those
that  follow  the  movement  of  goods  as  they  cross  the  border,  go  through  various
documentary, physical, technical and other requirements until final clearance and delivery.
It is the behaviour of the goods that is being observed.  However, attributing their movement
to specific interventions (e.g., at various windows) requires an analogous framework for
eliminating other explanations for the observations.  There may be a multitude of reasons
why  goods  movements  behave  the  way  these  do  during  import  and  export  formalities
(e.g., the type of goods, cargo content, country of origin and intermediate ports, broker for
the  consignee  etc.).    It  is  important  to  remove  alternative  credible  explanations  before
asserting  that  a  TF  measure  explains  the  movements.    The  resulting  changes  in  the
movement of goods can also be transformed into equivalent volume and value of trade
changes and other indirect effects in the same way that the other modes for examining TF
are specified and analysed.
Automation has not really been integral to the framework that has been used in
understanding how TF affects trade.  In many instances, the use of IT is subsumed in the
measures being studied.  For example, the Global Competitiveness Report rates the level
of efficiency in customs procedures but not specifically whether the customs environment
is automated or not.  In some instances, the use of IT in trade procedures falls far short of
being automated.
5 In a number of countries in Asia, IT is only utilized up to the submission
of goods declaration in electronic format.  Developing a procedure to evaluate the effects
of this partial IT would be difficult.
B.  Experience with information technology
in trade facilitation
There are not too many reviews of the use of IT as a TF measure.  In fact, the
recent  reviews  by  Grainger  (2007  and  2008)  noted  that  “...it  is  surprising  that  so  little
literature  on  the  subject  has  been  produced...” Although  the  OECD  (2005)  study  was
principally on customs automation, it also notes the paucity of reliable data across countries
5 Even if only certain steps in the procedures of a particular agency are automated (more specifically
in electronic format) there would always be benefits, however partial. It is a matter of measuring these
procedures against the alternatives. Customs procedures in some Asian countries are only partially
automated.32
that would allow a detailed assessment of the benefits and costs of customs automation.
One way of looking at IT for TF is to consider the existing literature, which appears to fall
within  two  distinct  categories.    One  category  provides  the  necessary  knowledge  for
developing IT systems that facilitate trade.  This means identifying technical conditions,
associated hardware and software essential to running automation, that help move goods
across different formalities.  Within this set of materials are various off-the-shelf programmes
that can run and operate the IT systems, or several independent IT systems that can be
replicated in other environments and settings.
But  the  “IT  for  TF”  in  this  sense  appears  too  broad.    First,  the  multitude  of
government and private agencies with border functions are part and parcel of what TF
should focus on, i.e., quarantine agencies, port authorities, warehousing establishments,
logistics firms, brokerage or customs house agents among many others.  The importance
of these different organizations depends on the types of products being moved, the location
of borders, and other physical and geographical conditions in the trade transactions.
Second, the development of IT platforms often takes place modularly, i.e., within
a single agency, and is dictated by its individual conditions, capacities and readiness, and
facilities, among others.  If the development is outsourced, as it may usually be, it would
be tailored to fit the organization.  Rolling out this single platform to the trade formalities
can be the TF.  Multiplying this development across many agencies, public and private,
does not guarantee that trade facilitation will take place.  For instance, there is a problem
of interoperability across varying platforms; thus, instead of facilitating formal processes,
the varying IT systems may even lengthen them.  Another example is that an IT system for
each agency may require different electronic forms; thus, electronically filed data may end
up  being  cumbersome  to  traders  and  the  different  systems  would  then  have  multiple
records for the same transaction.
Finally, IT being broad may not really be material to TF if there is active coordination
and  collaboration  in  the  development  of  IT  platforms.    Indeed,  this  may  require  the
designation  of  an  agency  to  act  as  a  hub,  gateway  or  portal  through  which  different
systems become interoperable.  Once the hub is agreed upon, the scale of TF will then
depend on the speed in which the other agencies and organizations are effectively linked.
The other category of literature on IT in TF focuses on analysing and measuring
the benefits from automation.  Indeed, the presumption of this category is that IT is clearly
beneficial,  based  on  classic  transformation  in  some  countries.    It  is  almost  taken  for
granted that when IT is carried out the benefits that accrue to trade outweigh the costs that
are incurred in installation, continuing maintenance and regular upgrading.
Since  both  categories  of  literature  usually  refer  to  IT  in  customs  and  customs-
related procedures, their institutional reference is a country’s Customs Administration.  The
benefits from IT depart from improvements in the area of customs formalities while the
development of IT platforms concentrates on how automation can be applied in its steps
and processes.33
It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  the  documented  experiences  in  IT  for TF  are
mostly in customs administration.  The OECD (2005) study considered different country
experiences in automation among both OECD and non-OECD countries.  The automation
TF  was  viewed  as  a  project  with  associated  costs  and  benefits.   Although  the  study
admitted that cost determination was unique to country characteristics and that there was
no common template, it noted that there were important parts of automation for which cost
parameters were more identifiable.  For example, the adoption of the off-the-shelf system,
i.e., Automated Systems for Customs Data (ASYCUDA), has predictable costs in installation
and maintenance; costs of computers and other hardware are readily available and some
infrastructure costs are also common.  In short, there are costs that allow comparability.
Automation costs are only part of the larger customs development programme in
the experiences of the Russian Federation, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Central
and Eastern Europe.  Between 40 per cent and 60 per cent of the total costs are for
automation;  however,  there  is  no  indication  what  the  remaining  costs  are  for  in  those
countries (OECD, 2005).  It is also important to note from these various country experiences
that while there is an expectation that migration to the Internet reduces costs in the long
term,  this  upgrading  will  initially  entail  costs  (e.g.,  Senegal’s  customs  operation
management  system  upgrading  to  a  web-based  version).    Cost  comparisons  are  also
available  between  off-the-shelf  systems  (e.g.,  ASYCUDA)  and  those  independently
developed to meet particular country settings, with the latter costing 10 times more.  In
addition to these general investment costs, there would be costs in running the automation
services when users access the facilities, submit forms and exchange messages with the
system.  In most instances, operating costs are shouldered by individual users on whom
fees are supposed to be levied that approximate the costs of delivering the services under
Article VIII of GATT 1994.
The benefits from automation go to private traders and governments in terms of
greater  efficiency  in  cargo  movements,  improved  governance  due  to  a  reduction  in
smuggling and in face-to-face transactions with officials, predictable revenues, and decline
in delays in transactions and their costs.  The measurement of benefits from automation
is  mostly  in  terms  of  the  reduction  in  the  customs  clearance  time  of  goods.    Country
experiences with these types of benefits show wide variation, from 168 hours in Guyana to
single-digit hours in other countries.  This is driven home further by comparisons between
automated and non-automated environments in customs procedures.  Again, the differences
between  the  two  have  wide  variations  (e.g.,  in  Thailand,  the  difference  is  between
one-third and one-quarter of the time in manual processes; in New Zealand, clearance by
automation is one-forty-eighth the manual time at maximum; in Chile it is one-fifth the
manual time).
6
Stacking up this array of quantitative benefits against costs answers the question
whether investment in automation pays off.  The experiences of automation in the United
States,  Chile  and  Singapore  are  described  as  illustrative  of  the  high  pay-off  from  the
6 In table 1 of OECD, 2005, the list of countries with customs automation includes information on
the year installed, coverage of the automation system that is installed and clearance time.34
application of IT in customs procedures.  Indeed, the benefit stream appears so large that
it becomes hardly an issue whether automation should take place.  Business savings,
productivity improvements and efficiencies in customs administration all point to the high
benefit-cost ratio of IT.
In the more detailed analysis by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the  Pacific  (ESCAP,  2002)  of  the  evolution  of  Singapore’s  automation  more  items  are
indicated as composing benefits and costs.  For example, the direct costs (S$ 20 million in
1987) constitute the development of the system, while some traders incur indirect costs
through subscription, access, equipment and set-up (some of these are one-time costs
and others are recurring transactions costs); others may incur more costs, especially those
that are not exposed to IT at all and thus the associated direct training costs.
On  the  other  hand,  not  included  in  the  estimated  stream  of  benefits  are  those
accruing to other government agencies using the system as well as other organizations
that indirectly benefit such as the transport sectors, logistics providers etc.  (Economic and
Social  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  2002).    Although  it  is  quite  clear,  if  not
obvious,  that  the  potential  benefits  from  automation  of  customs  procedures  in  TF  are
large, it also evident from the often-illustrate limited experiences that the details of these
benefits and costs in a project analysis context are not adequately laid out.
A comprehensive rationale can always be found for the application of IT in TF, e.g.,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2006), in terms of
increasing  the  volume  of  trade,  globalization  of  production  platforms  and  their  needed
speed and synchronization, increasing accessibility of telecommunications infrastructure
and liberalized environments, greater interaction with the transport and logistics sectors,
and expanded participation of the private sector in the management of trade processes
(e.g., through privatization of ports).  Indeed, electronic TF is ultimately viewed as a global
portal development derived from initial stages of single-window national portals to multi-
nation and regionally integrated single-window portals (McMaster and Nowak, undated).
Being technical in nature, the literature on developing the automation system for
TF  is  broadly  confined  to  the  types  of  software  and  hardware  that  are  essential  to
automating trade procedures.  There is a set of “best practices” for IT in national trade
facilitation (Schware and Kimberley, 1995).  In addition, the use of the current version of
ASYCUDA  is  the  de  facto  system  many  developing  countries  adopt  (UNCTAD,  2006).
Even if the “best practices” for IT may have been overtaken by events with the wider use
of the Internet and web platform, the focus by Schware and Kimberley (1995) on electronic
data interchange (EDI) does not diminish their discussion of the many even more important
enabling conditions for automation.  Indeed, there are several critical ingredients essential
for successful IT automation for TF – building awareness, working with potential users to
prepare them for ecommerce, developing and designing messages and guidelines, and
re-engineering  systems.    The  technology  costs  –  including  technology  services  to  be
provided  by  a  Value-Added  Network  (VAN)  provider  –  are  but  a  small  part  (typically
between 3 per cent and 10 per cent of all costs among the case studies reviewed) of
the overall costs and can be outsourced.  Note that in this EDI-based automation the
break-even period for typical investment is between 48 months and 72 months.35
The  utilization  of ASYCUDA  as  the  automation  instrument  for  many  developing
countries involves its application in customs administration.  Its installation clearly drives
home the point above that technology is exogenous and that there are more important
considerations to take in the use of IT in TF.  Some of the problems that come up with the
use of an off-the-shelf system, as in the case of ASYCUDA, appear when it is installed as
an external application on interrelated institutions and information flows (Alburo, 2007).
Thus, even if the costs of this technology are lower than other alternative systems, the
associated  adjustments  and  their  costs  in  the  long  term  must  be  taken  into  account.
OECD  (2005)  reported  that  the  installation  cost  of ASYCUDA  was  as  low  as  US$  1.5
million to US$ 2 million in 2002.
Many  countries  have  likewise  been  successful  in  developing  independent
automation  systems  tailored  specifically  to  their  particular  environments.   Although  the
development costs may be high for those countries, and development may be outsourced,
they take into account more closely the institutional set-up.  Such countries include ASEAN
members Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, plus the Russian Federation, the Republic of
Korea, Japan, the United States, and Central and Eastern Europe.  There is an analogy
here with regard to the use of EDI as the automation foundation in its early evolution.
However, the increasing availability of the Internet (coupled with its increasing security
properties)  provides  the  difference,  as  even  these  independent  systems  can  be  made
compatible with the widely used web-base to gain broad access.
It  is  not  surprising  that  the  development  of  these  independent  systems  has
triggered their participation in providing alternatives to ASYCUDA in developing automation
platforms.    In  fact,  Singapore’s  Crimson  Logic  (TradeNet),  Malaysia’s  DagangNet,  and
other  commercial  IT  providers  (e.g.,  Microsoft)  are  bidding  to  develop  independent
automation  in  other  developing  countries  including  participation  in  the  design  of  single
windows.  Given that these independent systems have been tested and used, they can
give more options than ASYCUDA.
Several observations can be made from this review of the relationship between IT
and TF.  While TF has wider impacts than can be captured by a narrow component in the
form of IT, the notion of facilitation would also include IT content.  However, to the extent
that the unique IT part can be identified, it is then possible to review what may be the
underlying interaction between the two.
First, as noted by those who have earlier reviewed the role of IT in TF, there is
limited literature that systematically relates the two.  In addition, the usual area of analysis
is customs-related automation.  This does not mean that automation is only effective in, or
has optimum impact on customs processes.  Yet there is a dearth of understanding and
analysis of IT in other areas of TF.  For example, there is limited available information (not
reviewed here) on how automation in quarantine procedures can facilitate trade.  Many
institutions  and  organizations  have  border  functions  and  their  relative  importance  is
a function of the types of goods traded.
Second,  the  limited  documentation  of  experience  with  IT  in  TF  often  assumes
substantial benefits from automation.  There is, of course, no doubt about their direction36
and  even  magnitude.    However,  it  is  scarcely  helpful  for  those  countries  considering
automation to take the benefits on faith, especially if there are alternative areas for IT
investments.
Third, in the customs procedures there is no indication of which parts of the overall
processes are automated.  It can always be assumed that it is an end-to-end automation.
Yet even in this scenario benefits are non-uniform and there is still a need to measure the
varying benefit streams rather than gloss over them, or worse, exaggerate them in terms
of either magnitude or time flow.
Fourth, what appears to follow from the reviews is a more careful specification and
analysis of the benefits and costs of IT investments.  Finer details of benefits and costs
allow greater deliberation of choices that governments may make in applying IT in TF.  For
example, the wide variation in clearance time for cargoes based on many surveys indicates
a need to understand why and to explore possible sources of explanation, and for greater
consciousness of what analytical tools to use in drawing a conclusion about the impacts of
IT.
7 This would be especially important to least developed countries with limited resources
but which are willing to invest in IT efforts with the largest impacts.  There needs to be
further specification of the incidence of an automated system, i.e., in which stage of the
procedural flow (if it is in customs) IT is effective.  Indeed, there may be cases where the
stage of a country’s trade does not, in fact, warrant automation, especially the type requiring
custom-built design.  The Revised Kyoto Convention specifically defines the use of IT only
when it is cost-effective.  Also, if service providers of customs IT are to come from the
private sector, careful feasibility analysis may not warrant full automation.
Finally, one way of validating the magnitude of benefits and costs is to undertake
a  post-project  evaluation  comparing  the  actual  benefits  and  costs  with  the  ex  ante
magnitude that led to the implementation of the automation.  While it is useful to validate
automation by estimating all savings with the use of the facilities, it is another thing to
decide on alternative IT choices
C.  Trade and information technology use in small and
medium-sized enterprises
The  initial  technology  used  in  customs  automation  was  EDI  and  its  costs  were
considered  high  for  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs).    As  Schware  and
Kimberley (1995) showed with their estimates of internal and external costs, these were
high  enough  to  become  barriers  to  entry  by  SMEs.    On  the  other  hand,  with  many
alternatives to connect to EDI (e.g., “low tech-no tech” non-computer technology and other
basic devices such as the telephone, fax and telex), SMEs can still become part of an
automated EDI system.
7 For example, one reason why the variation in cargo clearance time is so wide is because there is
also wide variation in the application of trade facilitation measures by customs in this case. It is not
clear if collecting more samples of cargoes can reduce such variation.37
Did EDI-based IT facilities actually expand the participation of SMEs in international
trade?  Would this kind of platform diffuse to the wider trading system across the global
community? While access by SMEs to EDI may have increased via other alternatives, this
was self-limiting.  In addition, the self-limitation was not due to lack of participation by
SMEs but because of EDI itself.  Aside from the costs involved in an EDI system and the
dedicated  nature  of  its  use,  Schware  and  Kimberley  (2005)  argued  that  it  was  made
problematic by the hybrid nature of the system in which EDI hubs used paper for the
majority  of  their  trading  partners  but  pure  EDI  for  a  small  though  growing  minority  of
partners.  This hybrid nature actually leads to higher, not lower, costs; thus, to convert all
partners into EDI would take a long time.  They correctly noted that the EDI “brick wall”,
which  makes  its  wider  diffusion  self-limiting,  was  the  work  involved  in  installing  and
integrating EDI into the business systems of traders.
Developments subsequent to EDI (e.g., the use of the extendable markup language
XML  and  transition  stages  through  more  access  points)  were  significant  in  the  further
automation of trade procedures and processes.  In addition, the integration of the Internet
into both off-the-shelf and dedicated platforms drastically eased the previous constraints,
paving the way for wider adoption of IT in TF.  However, even with expanded IT in TF
arising from reduced costs, the participation of SMEs have still apparently lagged behind,
although this is not just from the IT application but more generally in the internationalization
of the SMEs.
IT in TF for SMEs is set in a larger context in APEC (2003).  Here, e-commerce is
seen as providing unique opportunities for SMEs in the APEC economies to gain greater
access to international trade.  E-commerce technologies help SMEs realize reductions in
direct  costs  and  increase  efficiency  savings  that  arise  because  of  border  delays  and
documentation and which tend to add to the landed price of various products.  On the
other hand, the streamlining of customs, “... quarantine, health, and port services provided
by  government  agencies  to  the  trading  community...”  can  provide  efficiency  savings  to
resource- and time-deficient small businesses (APEC, 2003).  For small businesses to
benefit, IT should be seen as part of a comprehensive package involving all the facets of
e-commerce, thus including telecommunications infrastructure, legality of digital information
and signatures, security concerns, common if not harmonized standards, and cultural and
language differences.  These are concerns that go beyond the need for automating trade
formalities and how this would affect SMEs.
What constitutes barriers to international markets often discriminates against SMEs,
since large companies usually have resources to minimize risks in international commerce,
including strong lobbies for favourable laws and regulations (Fliess and Busquets, 2006).
In  the  context  of  increasing  globalization,  most  SMEs  that  are  accessing  international
markets have to face up to the need for networking with global firms and become part of
supply  chains.    They  become  more  vulnerable  to  access  constraints.    More  apparent
among  these  constraints  is  the  non-tariff  barriers  that  SMEs  face  in  their  trade,  e.g.,
through high costs of customs administration and restrictive health, safety and technical
standards, in which various procedures are involved.  Automating these processes and38
procedures in some way makes their barriers to SMEs more predictable, and costs can be
adjusted if not minimized.
Even  before  actually  engaging  in  international  trade,  SMEs  are  hampered  by
difficulties in obtaining information about laws, regulations, advisory services and even
market opportunities.  Without a way of obtaining regular information, SMEs tend to incur
more costs and time in getting such types of information than large companies, which
have more extensive resources.  This means that part of TF for SMEs would include easy
access to information that gets them into global commerce.  The application of IT involves
two  parts  –  access  to  electronic  sites  (e.g.,  chambers  of  commerce  and  industry
associations) that provide information services that SMEs can use, ranging from market
information to advisory services as well as access to electronic information on government
procedures, requirements of agencies that process trade transactions and product specific
information or links (Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade, 2005).
Once these types of facilities are provided there is still no assurance that SMEs will
actually  end  up  engaging  in  international  trade.    Many  reasons  have  been  advanced,
based  on  surveys  and  research,  for  SMEs’  inability  to  exploit  opportunities  in  export
businesses and to source inputs through importation.  Despite the potential arising from
globalization, a great deal of international commerce is done through network firms and
multinationals.  Large firms have actually been dominating in this set-up.  SMEs wanting to
participate in this globalization process must overcome existing barriers posed by large
multinationals.  Even for SMEs in developed countries these barriers are quite imposing –
big firms are able to leverage their large volumes to extract price, services and other add-
ons not available to SMEs (Shatz, 2004 and Goldsborough, 2005)
Without  internal  adjustments  on  the  part  of  SMEs,  they  remain  outside  global
commercial transactions.  In fact, a number of these adjustments would be IT-related, such
as process re-engineering, integration of business functions to improve coordination, links
among suppliers, vendors, partners and customers, and adoption of specific application
programmes related to international trade (Goldsborough, 2005).  In other words, SMEs
have to gear up to be capable of electronic link-ups with the external trading community
through internal capacity improvements not only of human resources (e.g., IT expertise)
but also the acquisition of necessary equipment and facilities as well as their appropriate
upgrading.  Where an option may be in the form of outsourcing some of the preparatory
system, it is important that the SMEs see their own adjustment as essential before capturing
the optimal benefits from exogenous IT-related TF measures.
Poor participation by SMEs in international trade can thus be partly traced to the
firms themselves and not only to the trading environment, which also implicitly favours
large enterprises.  Of course, problems with the trading environment may be onerous,
especially for SMEs as they often suffer from size limitations and lack of modern technology.
Thus,  the  environment  places  a  relatively  larger  burden  on  them  than  on  large  firms
(European Community, 1999).  What is emphasized is that SMEs become aware of best
international  practices  in  global  commerce  and  the  role  that TF  measures  can  play  in
ensuring their participation.39
Ultimately, the importance of IT to SMEs must be answered by the firms themselves.
Assuming  the  boundaries  of  IT  in  TF  for  SMEs  include  the  various  procedures  and
processes involved in trade formalities, the question is whether these are important to
SMEs.  If these are considered barriers by SMEs they are more external than internal, i.e.,
they are part of the SMEs’ business environment or accessibility to international markets.
International  SMEs,  however,  are  not  only  synonymous  with  exports  but  also  with
importation for eventual export.  They form part of the production platform where firms are
linked because of horizontal integration and component manufacturing.
One partial answer to the question of importance can be gleaned from a study of
SMEs across the APEC economies and OECD members (OECD-APEC, 2006).  A total of
978 SMEs were surveyed together with a matching survey of OECD-APEC Governments
on the same question of ranking barriers to SME internationalization.  The results indicated
that  what  the  policymakers  and  SMEs  commonly  perceived  as  the  10  most  important
barriers to internationalization centred around capabilities (e.g., lack of trained personnel
for internationalization and developing new products), finance (e.g., shortage of working
capital)  and  access  (e.g.,  limited  market  information,  identifying  business  opportunities
and unfamiliar export procedures/paperwork).  The business environment (e.g., unfamiliar
business  practices),  while  ranked  among  the  top  10,  fell  within  the  lower  half  of  the
perceived barriers.  The IT-related barrier, “high costs of customs administration”, ranked
twenty-ninth in importance to SMEs (and thirty-eighth in importance to governments).
Combining the surveys of policymakers and SMEs makes it possible to determine
what are commonly viewed as barriers to becoming international firms and the relative
importance of such barriers (summarized above).  From both the government and SME
sides,  barriers  that  TF  measures  are  supposed  to  address  are  not  viewed  as  highly
important.  They certainly do not rank among the most difficult barriers to overcome.  On
the other hand, these results do not appear to contradict the characterization of SMEs
from other studies.  Indeed, they reinforce each other.
Table 1 and figure 1 reproduce the ranking of barriers to SME internationalization
from  the  combined  perceptions  of  policymakers  and  SMEs,  and  the  ranking  by  SMEs
alone, respectively.  The top 10 ranking method provides consistency between what is
seen by the firms and what is seen by the policymakers as inhibiting the entry of SMEs
into international trading.
The OECD-APEC (2006) study does not explain these results, some of which are
surprising given the types of benefits that TF measures provide to SMEs.  Moreover, the
results are consistent with what OECD-APEC economic policymakers perceive as important
barriers  faced  by  SMEs  in  internationalization.    On  the  other  hand,  these  results  also
support earlier arguments that much of the internal efforts by SMEs are more important in
achieving access international markets than what facilities are in place to facilitate trade,
including IT.
These results may not really represent the sentiments of most SMEs, especially
those  from  developing  countries  or  those  that  are  contemplating  entering  international
markets.  In addition, the study admitted that there was “...a high degree of concentration40
Table 1.  Top 10 barriers to SME access to international markets as reported




1 Capabilities Inadequate quantity of and/or untrained personnel for
internationalization
2 Finance Shortage of working capital to finance exports
3 Access Limited information to locate/analyse markets
4 Access Identifying foreign business opportunities
5 Capabilities Lack of managerial time to deal with internationalization
6 Capabilities Inability to contact potential overseas customers
7 Capabilities Developing new products for foreign markets
8 Business Unfamiliar foreign business practices
9 Environment Meeting export product quality/standards/specifications
Capabilities
10 Access Unfamiliar exporting procedures/paperwork
Source: OECD Member Economy Policymaker Survey and SME Survey, 2006
Source: OECD-APEC 2006.
Figure 1.  Top 10 barriers to internationalization as ranked by SMEs
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Shortage of working capital to finance exports (F)
Identifying foreign business opportunities (A)
Limited information to locate/analyse markets (A)
Inability to contact potential overseas customers (A)
Obtaining reliable foreign representation (A)
Lack of managerial time to deal with internationalization (C)
Inadequate quantity of and/or untrained personnel for internationalization (C)
Difficulty in matching competitors’ prices (C)
Lack of home government assistance/incentives (BE)
Excessive transportation/insurance costs (C)
Unreliable data about the international market (A)
Offering satisfactory prices to customers (C)
Accessing export distribution channels (A)
Granting credit facilities to foreign customers (F)
Slow collection of payments from abroad (BE)
Keen competition in overseas markets (C)
Difficulties in enforcing contracts and resolving disputes (BE)
Complexity of foreign distribution channels (A)
Maintaining control over foreign middlemen (A)
Developing new products for foreign markets (C)41
[of  samples  from]  within  just  7  member  economies:    Canada  (217),  Greece  (128),
Switzerland (118), Turkey (77), Japan (74), Spain (60) and New Zealand (52)...” (OECD-
APEC,  2006).    Indeed,  the  developing  country  members  of  APEC  (as  well  as  other
economies that are added to the sample, such as Nepal) are underrepresented except for
Mexico and Chile (25 and 21 SMEs, respectively).  Unfortunately, no sub-sample report
exists  of  the  important  barriers  faced  by  the  developing  countries,  which  would  have
allowed tests of significance from the aggregate results.
Similarly, the study also stratified the SMEs into those not active in exporting, those
aspiring to be exporters and those actively exporting; it also captured those that were
importing (under the same classifications) with enough numbers among the categories
(e.g., 4.3 per cent not active in exporting, 27.6 per cent aspiring and 68.1 per cent actively
exporting).  Again, unfortunately, no report exists of how the perceptions differed according
to the actual participation of the SMEs in international trade (e.g., it can be argued that
those actively trading find IT more important than those not active, or even those aspiring
SMEs who have yet to experience internationalization).
Because the distribution of the SMEs was skewed towards the more developed
economies  and,  conversely,  the  small  size  of  the  SMEs  from  developing  economies,
finer-level analysis of the barriers they face may not be possible.  However, there can still
be  insights,  if  the  SMEs  are  further  analysed  according  to  their  actual  state  of
internationalization, into where TF may become more important.  The clustering of different
barriers can also provide useful insights into their varying importance to SMEs.
The fit of SMEs in trade facilitation is not as simple as it is often made out to be.
As the above review of existing knowledge shows, there are many ways of looking at how
SMEs enter global markets as well as where IT appears to be important.  It seems clear
that reduction of time for processing documents, simpler procedures for moving goods in
and out of ports, and improved coordination among the agencies with which SMEs deal in
connection with trade, all contribute to their efficiency and thus profitability.  Yet, there are
other equally important pre-requisites that SMEs must meet before they can effectively
venture into the global market – internal adjustments that include greater use of IT in firm
operations as well as other office routines that need retooling in order to cope with the way
international transactions are conducted.
D.  Summary and implications for inclusive growth
The literature on TF is extensive and it has not been exhaustively reviewed here.
However,  it  falls  into  two  distinct  categories.    One  category  analyses  the  broad
macroeconomic effects of TF, which means looking into the impacts on aggregate outputs,
employment and prices, among other areas.  The other category analyses TF effects on
narrower sectors of the economy, usually the trade areas.  The former therefore uses
macroeconomic methodologies while the latter relies on microeconomic and behavioural
models.  Both, however, use similar ways of indicating the TF measures that are analysed.
IT is only a part, and sometimes a small part, of all types of TF activities.42
While the results of most studies, whether aggregate or of narrower areas, indicate
the large quantitative benefits from TF, in terms of the specific questions of the use of IT in
general  and  automation  of  trade  formalities  in  particular,  several  observations  can  be
derived from the limited reviews in this chapter.
First,  it  appears  that  the  description  of  benefits  appears  too  broad.    Indeed,  in
some of the assessments of IT in TF, the benefits are taken more as matter of faith than of
detailed specification, and may turn out to be overstated.
Second, the costs of these IT systems for TF are often not given finer specification.
Whether costs are all to be borne by government investments or some are to be shouldered
by private traders is neither clear nor unambiguous.  Certainly the operation of IT systems,
for example, in customs declarations involves not just Customs Administrations but network
providers for which traders either subscribe or reconfigure their internal systems.
Third, it is not clear which part of the process of goods movement is the target of
IT; and neither is there a clear picture as to how different agencies with border functions
relate to IT development (which is usually undertaken in one agency, e.g., customs).
Fourth, there is no documented experience about the effects of partial automation,
i.e., where IT is applied only to particular parts of processes (e.g., entry lodgement or
submission of licence applications) in measurable ways.
Finally, in the specific cases of IT applications to TF, the experience appears to
indicate these have either been “plug-ins”, i.e., exogenous to the institutions or agencies
or customized, but still technically outsourced in development and in eventual installation
and operation.
These considerations, especially those related to the stream of quantitative benefits
and costs, are important for countries that are contemplating using IT as a TF instrument.
They need systematic insights into:  (a) what implications there are for partial versus full
automation and in which part of the processes; (b) which border agencies experience the
largest impacts from IT applications; and (c) the costs that would be borne by private
traders and associated transactions arising from IT.  More importantly, any public investment
in IT for TF has to be solidly based as project analysis and economic internal rates of
return evaluation.  Put differently, without sufficient knowledge about the relative benefits
of IT among different configurations, investments of scarce resources by poor countries
are not likely to be optimal.
The internationalization of SMEs is the underlying reason for looking at the role of
IT in TF among such businesses.  There is a dearth of literature on automation and IT in
TF,  particularly  in  the  case  of  SMEs.    Again,  the  limited  knowledge  that  is  available
apparently indicates that the importance and functions of TF and IT for SMEs are wide in
range.  Indeed, there appear to be important preconditions that SMEs need to meet before
they can effectively participate in international commerce.  Size, technology, and the lack
of networks and information are among the many barriers that SMEs need to overcome in
order to become internationalized.  IT in TF therefore may not be effective without prior43
upgrading by these businesses, especially among those SMEs that aim to become direct
international traders (as opposed to being indirect traders).
SMEs  play  a  significant  role  in  economic  development.    In  most  developing
countries, they account for a large share of employment, contribute to aggregate value
added,  and  are  spread  more  widely  in  location.   A  considerable  number  of  them  are
exporters  and  thus  are  earning  foreign  exchange.    The  global  community  sees  it  as
imperative that no potential international trader is excluded from international commerce
(European Community, 1999).  Facilities ought to be provided to those with trade potential,
either  in  the  form  of  TF  measures  or  outright  support.    To  the  extent  that  SMEs  are
potential traders but face barriers to entry, they should be provided with all TF support
measures, including access to IT applications in trade.
From among the many TF measures, some may be more neutral in terms of who
benefits  (e.g.,  basic  infrastructure  such  as  roads)  while  some  may  benefit  larger-sized
traders  more  than  smaller-scale  traders  (e.g.,  container  yards).    There  may  be  other
measures  that  benefit  smaller-scale  traders  more  than  larger-sized  traders  (e.g.,  basic
information on procedures).  In the case of IT, it is important to understand the means by
which  the  facility  may  be  delivered.    In  particular,  it  may  be  of  importance  to  SMEs
(a) which trade-related agencies have automated their functions, and to which parts of the
functions IT has been applied (if it is not end-to-end), (b) the method and requirements for
accessing the facility, and (c) the costs involved in participation.  For these reasons, some
relevant experiences are essential to gaining an understanding of what the implications
would be for SMEs.  As the review in this chapter shows, there is not much systematic
knowledge of this aspect.
Apart from the benefit-cost stream noted above, it is also essential to know if SMEs
have been considered in the development of IT for TF, whether it is for off-the-shelf or
custom-built technology.  From the viewpoint of governments or donor agencies, when
evaluating alternative ways to apply IT to trade a more specific project analysis is needed
than that currently documented in the relevant literature.  Indeed, what becomes critical in
any evaluation process is the long term implications of different systems, not only for the
specific agency where IT is to be applied but also for other agencies with which it has
functional relations.  From the viewpoint of traders, they need information about what is
required  of  them  in  the  automation  process  so  that  appropriate  adjustments  can  be
implemented; this is more so in the case of smaller-scale traders if they are to be part of
the IT for TF.  Differing technical conditions imposed by different systems will have impacts
on trader behaviour.
An IT system for trade would be part of the array of trade facilitation measures that
countries institute to speed up the movement of goods across borders.  How much the
facility would be utilized becomes a function of both the system and the users of such
a system.  The degree to which SMEs utilize an IT-based TF facility appears to depend on
several  preconditions  that  are  short  of  actual  engagement  in  internationalization  and
cross-border  transactions.    There  is  insufficient  documented  experience  for  providing
specific clues about what makes SMEs use an IT facility for trade transactions and how
they do so.  For example, SMEs could use third (and outside) parties to handle IT-related44
transactions such as brokerage and related services.  Or the entire IT-related functions for
SMEs could be outsourced.  All that is known from limited surveys is that other issues
exist that are more important barriers to SMEs in internationalizing their business, and that
the procedures involved in buying or selling goods in global markets – and which IT helps
overcome – rank low in their perception.  Thus, unless these issues are addressed first, IT
facilities for TF may be under-utilized.
What is useful in this regard is the argument of the Swedish National Board that
“...it  is  thus  not  essential  for  a  [developing]  country  to  have  a  fully-developed  IT
infrastructure, even if IT solutions in a longer perspective is [sic] very preferable...” (Swedish
Trade Procedures Council, 2003).  Sometimes the use of electronic and IT solutions may
lie far into the future since “...any technological solution will be close to ineffective without
a rationalized and standardized administrative foundation to build upon...” (Swedish Trade
Procedures Council, 2003).  What is needed is an examination of the underlying rationale
for eventual use of IT for transaction purposes.  This is consistent with the argument that
for SMEs to use IT for TF facilities there must be prior conditions that effectively prepare
them for the more elaborate electronic requirements of international commerce.  On the
other  hand,  as  pointed  out  above,  some  of  their  information  needs  are  provided  by
web-based sites, for which some basic infrastructure is critical.  The configuration of this
infrastructure also needs to be spelt out.
In summary, several foundational elements are important to understand how SMEs
are affected by trade facilitation, and the use of IT in TF.  Only through a more systematic
understanding of the conditions and actual environments in which SMEs operate – and the
extent to which they are engaged in international trade – will it be possible to determine
the effectiveness of TF for SMEs.45
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